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A
prominent financier argues that the heedless assertion
of American power in the world resembles a financial
bubble‹and the moment of truth may be here.
It
is generally agreed that September 11, 2001, changed
the course of history. But we must ask ourselves
why that should be so. How could a single event,
even one involving 3,000 civilian casualties,
have such a far-reaching effect? The answer lies
not so much in the event itself as in the way
the United States, under the leadership of President
George W. Bush, responded to it.
Admittedly,
the terrorist attack was historic in its own right.
Hijacking fully fueled airliners and using them
as suicide bombs was an audacious idea, and its
execution could not have been more spectacular.
The destruction of the Twin Towers of the World
Trade Center made a symbolic statement that reverberated
around the world, and the fact that people could
watch the event on their television sets endowed
it with an emotional impact that no terrorist
act had ever achieved before. The aim of terrorism
is to terrorize, and the attack of September 11
fully accomplished this objective.
Even
so, September 11 could not have changed the course
of history to the extent that it has if President
Bush had not responded to it the way he did. He
declared war on terrorism, and under that guise
implemented a radical foreign-policy agenda whose
underlying principles predated the tragedy. Those
principles can be summed up as follows: International
relations are relations of power, not law; power
prevails and law legitimizes what prevails. The
United States is unquestionably the dominant power
in the post-Cold War world; it is therefore in
a position to impose its views, interests, and
values. The world would benefit from adopting
those values, because the American model has demonstrated
its superiority. The Clinton and first Bush Administrations
failed to use the full potential of American power.
This must be corrected; the United States must
find a way to assert its supremacy in the world.
This
foreign policy is part of a comprehensive ideology
customarily referred to as neoconservatism, though
I prefer to describe it as a crude form of social
Darwinism. I call it crude because it ignores
the role of cooperation in the survival of the
fittest, and puts all the emphasis on competition.
In economic matters the competition is between
firms; in international relations it is between
states. In economic matters social Darwinism takes
the form of market fundamentalism; in international
relations it is now leading to the pursuit of
American supremacy.
Not
all the members of the Bush Administration subscribe
to this ideology, but neoconservatives form an
influential group within it. They publicly called
for the invasion of Iraq as early as 1998. Their
ideas originated in the Cold War and were further
elaborated in the post-Cold War era. Before September
11 the ideologues were hindered in implementing
their strategy by two considerations: George W.
Bush did not have a clear mandate (he became President
by virtue of a single vote in the Supreme Court),
and America did not have a clearly defined enemy
that would have justified a dramatic increase
in military spending.
September
11 removed both obstacles. President Bush declared
war on terrorism, and the nation lined up behind
its President. Then the Bush Administration proceeded
to exploit the terrorist attack for its own purposes.
It fostered the fear that has gripped the country
in order to keep the nation united behind the
President, and it used the war on terrorism to
execute an agenda of American supremacy. That
is how September 11 changed the course of history.
Exploiting
an event to further an agenda is not in itself
reprehensible. It is the task of the President
to provide leadership, and it is only natural
for politicians to exploit or manipulate events
so as to promote their policies. The cause for
concern lies in the policies that Bush is promoting,
and in the way he is going about imposing them
on the United States and the world. He is leading
us in a very dangerous direction.
The
supremacist ideology of the Bush Administration
stands in opposition to the principles of an open
society, which recognize that people have different
views and that nobody is in possession of the
ultimate truth. The supremacist ideology postulates
that just because we are stronger than others,
we know better and have right on our side. The
very first sentence of the September 2002 National
Security Strategy (the President's annual laying
out to Congress of the country's security objectives)
reads, "The great struggles of the twentieth century
between liberty and totalitarianism ended with
a decisive victory for the forces of freedom and
a single sustainable model for national success:
freedom, democracy, and free enterprise."
The
assumptions behind this statement are false on
two counts. First, there is no single sustainable
model for national success. Second, the American
model, which has indeed been successful, is not
available to others, because our success depends
greatly on our dominant position at the center
of the global capitalist system, and we are not
willing to yield it.
The
Bush doctrine, first enunciated in a presidential
speech at West Point in June of 2002, and incorporated
into the National Security Strategy three months
later, is built on two pillars: the United States
will do everything in its power to maintain its
unquestioned military supremacy; and the United
States arrogates the right to pre-emptive action.
In effect, the doctrine establishes two classes
of sovereignty: the sovereignty of the United
States, which takes precedence over international
treaties and obligations; and the sovereignty
of all other states, which is subject to the will
of the United States. This is reminiscent of George
Orwell's Animal Farm: all animals are equal,
but some animals are more equal than others.
To
be sure, the Bush doctrine is not stated so starkly;
it is shrouded in doublespeak. The doublespeak
is needed because of the contradiction between
the Bush Administration's concept of freedom and
democracy and the actual principles and requirements
of freedom and democracy. Talk of spreading democracy
looms large in the National Security Strategy.
But when President Bush says, as he does frequently,
that freedom will prevail, he means that America
will prevail. In a free and open society, people
are supposed to decide for themselves what they
mean by freedom and democracy, and not simply
follow America's lead. The contradiction is especially
apparent in the case of Iraq, and the occupation
of Iraq has brought the issue home. We came as
liberators, bringing freedom and democracy, but
that is not how we are perceived by a large part
of the population.
It
is ironic that the government of the most successful
open society in the world should have fallen into
the hands of people who ignore the first principles
of open society. At home Attorney General John
Ashcroft has used the war on terrorism to curtail
civil liberties. Abroad the United States is trying
to impose its views and interests through the
use of military force. The invasion of Iraq was
the first practical application of the Bush doctrine,
and it has turned out to be counterproductive.
A chasm has opened between America and the rest
of the world.
The
size of the chasm is impressive. On September
12, 2001, a special meeting of the North Atlantic
Council invoked Article 5 of the NATO Treaty for
the first time in the alliance's history, calling
on all member states to treat the terrorist attack
on the United States as an attack upon their own
soil. The United Nations promptly endorsed punitive
U.S. action against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. A
little more than a year later the United States
could not secure a UN resolution to endorse the
invasion of Iraq. Gerhard Schröder won re-election
in Germany by refusing to cooperate with the United
States. In South Korea an underdog candidate was
elected to the presidency because he was considered
the least friendly to the United States; many
South Koreans regard the United States as a greater
danger to their security than North Korea. A large
majority throughout the world opposed the war
on Iraq.
September
11 introduced a discontinuity into American foreign
policy. Violations of American standards of behavior
that would have been considered objectionable
in ordinary times became accepted as appropriate
to the circumstances. The abnormal, the radical,
and the extreme have been redefined as normal.
The advocates of continuity have been pursuing
a rearguard action ever since.
To
explain the significance of the transition, I
should like to draw on my experience in the financial
markets. Stock markets often give rise to a boom-bust
process, or bubble. Bubbles do not grow out of
thin air. They have a basis in reality but reality
as distorted by a misconception. Under normal
conditions misconceptions are self-correcting,
and the markets tend toward some kind of equilibrium.
Occasionally, a misconception is reinforced by
a trend prevailing in reality, and that is when
a boom-bust process gets under way. Eventually
the gap between reality and its false interpretation
becomes unsustainable, and the bubble bursts.
Exactly
when the boom-bust process enters far-from-equilibrium
territory can be established only in retrospect.
During the self-reinforcing phase participants
are under the spell of the prevailing bias. Events
seem to confirm their beliefs, strengthening their
misconceptions. This widens the gap and sets the
stage for a moment of truth and an eventual reversal.
When that reversal comes, it is liable to have
devastating consequences. This course of events
seems to have an inexorable quality, but a boom-bust
process can be aborted at any stage, and the adverse
effects can be reduced or avoided altogether.
Few bubbles reach the extremes of the information-technology
boom that ended in 2000. The sooner the process
is aborted, the better.
The
quest for American supremacy qualifies as a bubble.
The dominant position the United States occupies
in the world is the element of reality that is
being distorted. The proposition that the United
States will be better off if it uses its position
to impose its values and interests everywhere
is the misconception. It is exactly by not abusing
its power that America attained its current position.
Where
are we in this boom-bust process? The deteriorating
situation in Iraq is either the moment of truth
or a test that, if it is successfully overcome,
will only reinforce the trend.
Whatever
the justification for removing Saddam Hussein,
there can be no doubt that we invaded Iraq on
false pretenses. Wittingly or unwittingly, President
Bush deceived the American public and Congress
and rode roughshod over the opinions of our allies.
The gap between the Administration's expectations
and the actual state of affairs could not be wider.
It is difficult to think of a recent military
operation that has gone so wrong. Our soldiers
have been forced to do police duty in combat gear,
and they continue to be killed. We have put at
risk not only our soldiers' lives but the combat
effectiveness of our armed forces. Their morale
is impaired, and we are no longer in a position
to properly project our power. Yet there are more
places than ever before where we might have legitimate
need to project that power. North Korea is openly
building nuclear weapons, and Iran is clandestinely
doing so. The Taliban is regrouping in Afghanistan.
The costs of occupation and the prospect of permanent
war are weighing heavily on our economy, and we
are failing to address many festering problems
domestic and global. If we ever needed proof
that the dream of American supremacy is misconceived,
the occupation of Iraq has provided it. If we
fail to heed the evidence, we will have to pay
a heavier price in the future.
Meanwhile,
largely as a result of our preoccupation with
supremacy, something has gone fundamentally wrong
with the war on terrorism. Indeed, war is a false
metaphor in this context. Terrorists do pose a
threat to our national and personal security,
and we must protect ourselves. Many of the measures
we have taken are necessary and proper. It can
even be argued that not enough has been done to
prevent future attacks. But the war being waged
has little to do with ending terrorism or enhancing
homeland security; on the contrary, it endangers
our security by engendering a vicious circle of
escalating violence.
The
terrorist attack on the United States could have
been treated as a crime against humanity rather
than an act of war. Treating it as a crime would
have been more appropriate. Crimes require police
work, not military action. Protection against
terrorism requires precautionary measures, awareness,
and intelligence gathering all of which ultimately
depend on the support of the populations among
which the terrorists operate. Imagine for a moment
that September 11 had been treated as a crime.
We would not have invaded Iraq, and we would not
have our military struggling to perform police
work and getting shot at.
Declaring
war on terrorism better suited the purposes of
the Bush Administration, because it invoked military
might; but this is the wrong way to deal with
the problem. Military action requires an identifiable
target, preferably a state. As a result the war
on terrorism has been directed primarily against
states harboring terrorists. Yet terrorists are
by definition non-state actors, even if they are
often sponsored by states.
The
war on terrorism as pursued by the Bush Administration
cannot be won. On the contrary, it may bring about
a permanent state of war. Terrorists will never
disappear. They will continue to provide a pretext
for the pursuit of American supremacy. That pursuit,
in turn, will continue to generate resistance.
Further, by turning the hunt for terrorists into
a war, we are bound to create innocent victims.
The more innocent victims there are, the greater
the resentment and the better the chances that
some victims will turn into perpetrators.
The
terrorist threat must be seen in proper perspective.
Terrorism is not new. It was an important factor
in nineteenth-century Russia, and it had a great
influence on the character of the czarist regime,
enhancing the importance of secret police and
justifying authoritarianism. More recently several
European countries Italy, Germany, Great Britain
had to contend with terrorist gangs, and it took
those countries a decade or more to root them
out. But those countries did not live under the
spell of terrorism during all that time. Granted,
using hijacked planes for suicide attacks is something
new, and so is the prospect of terrorists with
weapons of mass destruction. To come to terms
with these threats will take some adjustment;
but the threats cannot be allowed to dominate
our existence. Exaggerating them will only make
them worse. The most powerful country on earth
cannot afford to be consumed by fear. To make
the war on terrorism the centerpiece of our national
strategy is an abdication of our responsibility
as the leading nation in the world. Moreover,
by allowing terrorism to become our principal
preoccupation, we are playing into the terrorists'
hands. They are setting our priorities.
A recent Council on Foreign Relations publication
sketches out three alternative national-security
strategies. The first calls for the pursuit of
American supremacy through the Bush doctrine of
pre-emptive military action. It is advocated by
neoconservatives. The second seeks the continuation
of our earlier policy of deterrence and containment.
It is advocated by Colin Powell and other moderates,
who may be associated with either political party.
The third would have the United States lead a
cooperative effort to improve the world by engaging
in preventive actions of a constructive character.
It is not advocated by any group of significance,
although President Bush pays lip service to it.
That is the policy I stand for.
The
evidence shows the first option to be extremely
dangerous, and I believe that the second is no
longer practical. The Bush Administration has
done too much damage to our standing in the world
to permit a return to the status quo. Moreover,
the policies pursued before September 11 were
clearly inadequate for dealing with the problems
of globalization. Those problems require collective
action. The United States is uniquely positioned
to lead the effort. We cannot just do anything
we want, as the Iraqi situation demonstrates,
but nothing much can be done in the way of international
cooperation without the leadership or at least
the participation of the United States.
Globalization
has rendered the world increasingly interdependent,
but international politics is still based on the
sovereignty of states. What goes on within individual
states can be of vital interest to the rest of
the world, but the principle of sovereignty militates
against interfering in their internal affairs.
How to deal with failed states and oppressive,
corrupt, and inept regimes? How to get rid of
the likes of Saddam? There are too many such regimes
to wage war against every one. This is the great
unresolved problem confronting us today.
I
propose replacing the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive
military action with preventive action of a constructive
and affirmative nature. Increased foreign aid
or better and fairer trade rules, for example,
would not violate the sovereignty of the recipients.
Military action should remain a last resort. The
United States is currently preoccupied with issues
of security, and rightly so. But the framework
within which to think about security is collective
security. Neither nuclear proliferation nor international
terrorism can be successfully addressed without
international cooperation. The world is looking
to us for leadership. We have provided it in the
past; the main reason why anti-American feelings
are so strong in the world today is that we are
not providing it in the present.
Topplebush.com
Posted: November 24, 2003
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