You can find the second part of this article called: The Detour to Iraq - Part 11 on our website.

Contrary to popular perception, President Bush has been weak, not strong, in leading the war on terror. Faced with a major al-Qaeda threat from the very inception of his Administration and a build-up of unprecedented warnings, the President did nothing to reduce the threat or the nation's vulnerability. Worldwide intelligence had urgently warned the President of an attack and suggested airplane hijacking as a distinct possibility. The President could and should have called in heads of agencies, put the government in a crisis mode and demanded special protection for commercial aviation.

Since 9-11 the President has been too cowardly to accept any responsibility, has instituted the most massive cover-up in history and has allowed others to bear the brunt of his mistakes. For reasons explained in a special section of this article, the 9-11 commission chose not to assess responsibility at top government levels.

Instead of leading a worldwide effort to remove the al-Qaeda threat, the President insisted on invading a country that had no operational connection to either 9-11 or al-Qaeda, nor represented a threat. As a result, al-Qaeda continues to attack around the world and remains a major threat to the United States.

Because of the President's mistaken war in Iraq, our military continues to suffer loss of life and many thousands of injuries. He has no workable exit strategy. This article lays out a flexible one that can be adapted to changing circumstances on the ground.

Strong advice and warnings on terror not confronted

When the Bush Administration took office, al-Qaeda was already a major threat to this nation.

The President was warned, during transition, that al-Qaeda would be his "greatest" and "gravest" threat. These warnings came directly from President Clinton and CIA Director Tenet. As a result of earlier attacks, Clinton had (1) prosecuted those responsible for the first World Trade Center attack, (2) authorized missile strikes on al-Qaeda and (3) instructed the CIA to capture or kill al-Qaeda's leader, Osama bin Laden. He also undertook multiple diplomatic efforts, received a pipeline of daily reports on al-Qaeda and exercised extreme precautions at the turn of the century to prevent further attacks.

Following the former President's warnings, a U.S. Commission on National Security warned President Bush of an impending domestic catastrophe. They urged him to reorganize the government to set up a Homeland Security Department. The President did not act on advice from either source and, actually, downgraded the White House anti-terror unit. That unit no longer had access to the President or to agency heads.

During the spring of 2001, terrorism warnings surged dramatically and by that summer they had reached a crescendo: "most of al-Qaeda is anticipating" a U.S. attack, "something very, very, very, very big is about to happen," "something spectacular." Frantic with concern, the CIA Director warned the President of a "significant attack in the near future."

The President received 40 CIA briefings mentioning al-Qaeda or bin Laden before 9-11. In the infamous briefing of Aug. 6, 2001, the CIA informed the President of al-Qaeda's determination "to attack within the United States" and mentioned the possibility of aircraft hijacking. On vacation in Texas, the President did not take control, call agency heads together or go into a full crisis mode. He did not warn the public.

Vice-President Cheney also received special briefings from (1) former Clinton aides on the gravity of the al-Qaeda threat and (2) the CIA confirming al-Qaeda's responsibility for the USS Cole attack. During his campaign Bush said "there must be consequences" for the USS Cole. Also, Afghanistan had been told it would be held responsible for any further al-Qaeda attacks. The President took no action to respond to the USS Cole attack or against Afghanistan.

National Security Advisor Rice also was briefed by Clinton aides on the al-Qaeda threat. This briefing included a plan (used after 9-11) to attack the al-Qaeda network. But, not-invented-here raised its ugly head. Bush's people could not buy into an analysis of the Clinton Administration. Demoting the anti-terror unit had slowed down decision-making -- there was no sense of urgency. Terrorism was not discussed in any national security meetings until September.

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Wolfowitz simply were preoccupied with other perceived threats, and were obsessed with a national system for missile defense. In fact, in a meeting with the deputies of other agencies, Wolfowitz said: "Well, I just don't understand why we are beginning by talking about this one man, bin Laden." Meanwhile, Rumsfeld threatened a presidential veto, if Congress shifted $600 million in missile defense money to counter-terrorism. The Defense Department did not have a mission to counter al-Qaeda. Joint Chiefs Chairman Shelton told the Commission the Administration did not show much interest in military options.

Attorney General Ashcroft flatly rejected a $50 million request for an FBI counterterrorism program and, according to the bureau, asked that he not be briefed on this subject any further.

------

The Commission confirmed that the briefing to the President on Aug. 6, 2001 was not "historical" in nature, as purported, but instead revealed al-Qaeda's intentions to attack the United States. This briefing said that al-Qaeda had operatives residing in the U.S. and that the FBI had found "patterns of suspicious activity consistent with preparations for hijacking." The CIA considered the Aug. 6 briefing an opportunity to tell the President that the bin Laden threat was "both current and serious."

The 9-11 Commission also confirmed that our intelligence did know there was a possibility that hijackers might fly into targets such as the World Trade Center. Both the history of terrorism and frequent intelligence suggested hijacking.

Exact knowledge of the targets or timing of the attack was not required -- as the White House contends. All the Administration had to do was protect against hijacking of commercial aircraft -- just that one thing. Yet, nothing was done to fix airline vulnerabilities or prepare for suicide hijacking. As the Commission concluded, domestic agencies never mobilized a response, got direction or had a plan. The public was not warned.

The horrible 9-11 tragedy might have been averted if the President had maintained or increased the priority of the previous Administration, responded against al-Qaeda and Afghanistan for the USS Cole attack, mobilized homeland security protection and responded to the extraordinary warnings received during the spring and summer of 2001.

These things didn't happen, and we haven't been told why. Was the President preoccupied with his own agenda, or was he overly concerned with the impact of a fearful public on a sagging economy, or as a special report said:

"...many of those in the know -- the spooks, the buttoned-down bureaucrats, the law-enforcement professionals in a dozen countries -- were almost frantic with worry that a major terrorist attack against American interests was imminent. It wasn't averted because 2001 saw a systemic collapse in the ability of Washington's national security apparatus to handle the terrorist threat."

Time Magazine,
"The Secret History,"
Aug. 12, 2002

The 9-11 cover-up

The President's attitude on cooperation with the 9-11 Commission has been just the opposite of what it should be. As Commander-in-Chief, he should have worked with the Commission to get at the heart of the problem, with the idea of preventing future attacks. Instead, for a year, the White House resisted the investigative commission and then stonewalled it for another year.

As commissioners have acknowledged, they suffered from lengthy delays, maddening restrictions and disputes over access to sensitive documents and witnesses. As just one example, the Commission (after months of denial) finally got limited access to Bush's intelligence briefings, but only after threatening him with a subpoena. A group of the 9-11 families working with the commission (the Jersey girls) said"...it was President Bush who thwarted our attempts at every turn."

Where the Commission report differs from this article

The Commission's report contains excellent findings and recommendations concerning the intelligence community, FBI, immigration, Congress, etc. -- but, no findings on the White House, its priorities, or presidential leadership. Why didn't the Commission connect the dots?

The five Republican and five Democrat party members on the 9-11 Commission were faced with a difficult situation during an election year -- either (1) don't address top-level responsibility and come out with a unified, bipartisan report that would be acted upon or (2) assign some degree of responsibility to the President and his advisors and have a divided report that would gather dust. The Commission firmly believed that "in order to have a strong public impact the report had to be unanimous."

Was 9-11 preventable?

The Commission says opportunities were missed, but all those mentioned were at the operational level -- none at the very top levels of government.

This article says the President did not act to reduce the nation's vulnerability to the threat or respond to either strong advice or serious warnings. Any of those actions might have prevented 9-11.

Presidential understanding of threat

The Commission says the President did not have a complete picture of the threat or an understanding of its gravity.

This article says there was full understanding of the threat and its gravity, as documented in Time Magazine's "Secret History," in Richard Clarke's book, "Against All Enemies," and in the Commission's report itself. For example, the Commission's chapter, "The System is Blinking Red," discloses compelling evidence of an impending catastrophic attack demanding immediate presidential action.

To illustrate, the chapter shows that the number and severity of reported threats were unprecedented and that many officials knew something terrible was planned. Warnings were in terms of "catastrophic proportions" and "on a calamitous level, causing the world to be in turmoil."

Desperate to get top level attention, the head of the White House anti-terror unit asked "decision makers to imagine a future day when hundreds of Americans lay dead." Two officials in government considered resigning in order to go public with their concerns. Two weeks before 9-11, the head of the FBI office for national security in New York resigned in frustration. He took charge of security at the World Trade Center. He did not survive.

Responsibility for 9-11

The Commission says senior (unnamed) officials across government share in the responsibility and that our national leaders could have done more. It lays much of the blame on intelligence, FBI, immigration, Congress, etc.

This article says our national leaders should have done more to reduce the nation's vulnerability. Undoubtedly, senior officials in operations would have become much more responsive to the threat had the President led the way, called in the heads of their agencies and shared information with them and the general public.

The Commission's omission of top level responsibility has already been challenged by two book reviews of its report (David Ignatius, Wash. Post and Elizabeth Drew, The New York Review of Books) and by Richard Clarke in a New York Times op-ed piece. Ignatius concluded:

"The Bush team ... didn't get serious about bin Laden...In truth, nothing would have prevented the national security advisor...from mobilizing anti-terrorism policy against al-Qaeda in the months before 9-11. That's what makes this story a tragedy--that existing institutions of government might have averted the disaster, if they had taken action."

In an extensive analysis that included interviews with commissioners and key staff members, Elizabeth Drew concluded:

"In an effort to achieve a unanimous, bipartisan report, the commission decided not to assign 'individual blame' and avoided overt criticism of the President himself. Still, the report is a powerful indictment of the Bush Administration for its behavior before and after the attack of September 11."

The defect in the Commission's analysis

The Commission focused on a question that was too narrow and nearly impossible to answer: Could 9-11 have been prevented? To answer that question either way could be construed as self-serving and would encourage the use of 20/20 hindsight. The broader, more appropriate question was: put yourself in the shoes of the President in the months leading up to 9-11 -- what would a reasonable and prudent person do in the same situation -- irrespective of the result? In other words: What would any president do when confronted with an al-Qaeda declaration of war, a history of earlier attacks, strong advice on the gravity of the threat and serious warnings of impending attacks?

It would be nice to know exactly where the new attacks might take place and their timing. However, the only reasonable alternative for any president would have been to put the country in a crisis mode and take immediate action to defend the nation. In the end, the measures taken should have shown a government in action, anxious to protect its people and determined to make it difficult for terrorist attacks to succeed. That's all we can expect -- but no less.

Bottom line

President Bush presided over the greatest national security failure in our history. We may never know for an absolute certainty whether 9-11 could have been prevented. The critical issue is Bush's inattention to the subject, his lack of response to repeated warnings, his absence of leadership when it really counted and the White House cover-up since then.

Although the politically-divided Commission on 9-11 could not bring itself to assess responsibility at top levels of government, the information is there in its report for anyone who wants to get the facts and draw their own conclusions. When the report was released, the scapegoats came from lower ranks and middle management -- the upper echelons must have breathed a huge sigh of relief.

The most incredible thing is that Bush has exploited the disaster by using it to support a war in Iraq, gain control of Congress and further his own reelection campaign. Traditionally, the Republicans should have lost rather than gained seats in the mid-term elections. A constant drumbeat of an impending war turned the tide.

Had Bush prevented the terrorist attacks, the increase in his popularity would have been short-lived. He didn't prevent them, however, and his neglect before 9-11 is now the reason he has a serious chance for reelection. New York City - a Democrat citadel - was chosen to host the Republican Convention (near ground zero). The slogan was "Stay Safe: Reelect Bush."

Bush's diversion of our military power to Iraq has made us less safe. Al-Qaeda is still alive and well, and our unprovoked invasion has inspired a whole new generation of terrorists. According to an independent survey, al-Qaeda's ranks have swollen to 18,000 spread over more than 60 countries. They periodically attack around the globe and remain a constant threat to us.

A bolder U.S. terror strategy of global proportions is long overdue. Bush's idea that we can cope with each and every country that supports or harbors terrorists is foolish (cowboy) bravado and impossible to achieve. Ridding the world of terrorism is a shared responsibility, demanding worldwide resources and leadership from all heads of state. Each country should have a mandate to rid itself of terrorism and to ask other countries for military and other assistance, as needed. Such a world-wide endeavor must be reinforced with head of state progress meetings.

We certainly cannot stamp out terrorism and hatred solely with military force. America needs to sponsor a high level UN commission to identify fundamental changes that would reverse the root causes of organized violent behavior in this world. People everywhere need hope that one day we will return to more peaceful ways, without a fortress mentality.

Topplebush.com
Posted: September 29, 2004